2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

5-15-2012

USA v. Daniel Siddons

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012

Recommended Citation
"USA v. Daniel Siddons" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 1000.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1000

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

DLD-170

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-1208
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DANIEL R. SIDDONS,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 2:07-cr-00717-001)
District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
April 26, 2012
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 15, 2012)
_________
OPINION
_________

PER CURIAM
On January 9, 2012, appellant Siddons—a federal prisoner currently incarcerated
at FCI Fort Dix in New Jersey—filed a document entitled “Motion for Clarification of the
Record” on his criminal docket in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania. While emphasizing that he was “not asking for any adjustment or relief

from his judgment and conviction,” Siddons demanded that the District Court clarify the
factual bases of certain findings and rulings, such as its conclusions “as to the credibility
and veracity of the testimony from” his former attorneys. Far from being a neutral filing
with greater clarity as its sole aim, the motion obviously challenged the factual findings
in question; moreover, it also requested relief that would imply the modification of
Siddons’s conviction and sentence, such as by adjustment to the restitution order. 1 The
District Court denied the motion as frivolous, and Siddons timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291; and, as we agree with the District
Court that the motion is frivolous, we will summarily affirm its order. Murray v.
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4;
I.O.P. 10.6. Siddons points to no law, rule, or procedure that would compel the District
Court to make the “corrections” he seeks. Indeed, focusing on “the function of the
motion, [and] not its caption,” Turner v. Evers, 726 F.2d 112, 114 (3d Cir. 1984), it is
clear that Siddons was attempting, in a circuitoust fashion, to challenge his conviction or
sentence. He continues to do so on appeal, arguing that the District Court “ignore[d]
salient facts which would otherwise prove favorable” to him, and describing the adverse
factual findings made as “[s]imply . . . wrong.” The obvious time to raise these
arguments, of course, was on direct appeal. See United States v. Siddons, 660 F.3d 699,
709 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming the judgment of sentence). Siddons may otherwise bring
his challenge through a permissible form of collateral attack, such as a motion to vacate
1

E.g., “because this Court ignored salient facts by choosing expediency and cronyism
over being thorough, it utterly failed in its obligation to provide all those adversely
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under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. But he is in no position to demand that the District Court
explain aspects of its ruling—many of which it has already clarified at great length, see
United States v. Siddons, Criminal No. 07-717, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115193, at *8–21
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2009)—under the otherwise-innocuous label of “clarification.”
In sum, and for the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the
District Court.

affected in this case with equal legal recourse . . . .”
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